That's what the security of one-time pad gives you: seeing the ciphertext does not help guess what the plaintext was (in fact, the ciphertext by itself gives no information about the plaintext). Based on this, I can't guess your secret message with probability better than $1/26^$. Suppose I already know that the secret message is 100 English characters long.

Isn't this algorithm as secure as Vernam under these assumption(s)? Just as Vernam has assumptions such as 'totally random', assumptions such as 'if the artificial intelligence produces messages that are too good for Eve to sift through' can be made in this algorithm. I also know that this algorithm does not check if the message has been corrupted by Eve. But if the AI's algorithm is good enough, Eve will be truly helpless. I know if Eve knows Bob or Alice, she can cancel out some probabilities. Life would be better if I didn't have a chronic cough'ġ001. Message: 'So what did you say about me? I hope you mentioned that I'm a great person'ģ. Message: 'You know I got over my depression. Let artificial intelligence prepare 1000 meaningful messages again 1. Let Bob's answer be 'I studied in Ukraine' But Bob know because of '97' which is secret key. Eve can not be sure about what is the original message. Message: 'I didn't understand the ontological argument in the book you suggested' Message: 'Has your illness passed? Are you better?'ġ001. Let this artificial intelligence produce 1000 meaningful messages 1. Suppose we have an artificial intelligence. Let's call it '97'Īlice's original message is 'Where did you study?' Suppose Alice and Bob choose a number face to face.

Vernam encryption algorithm